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The hedonic model of Rosen (1974) has become a workhorse for valuing the characteristics of differentiated
products despite a number of well-documented econometric problems. For example, Bartik (1987)
and Epple (1987) each describe a source of endogeneity in the second stage of Rosen's procedure that
has proven difficult to overcome.  In this paper, we propose a new approach for recovering the marginal
willingness-to-pay function that altogether avoids these endogeneity problems. Applying this estimator
to data on large changes in violent crime rates, we find that marginal willingness-to-pay increases
by ten cents with each additional violent crime per 100,000 residents.
Kelly C. Bishop
Olin Business School
Washington University in St. Louis
Box 1133, 1 Brookings Drive










Dating back to the work of Court (1939), Grilliches (1961), and Lancaster (1966), hedonic
techniques have been used to estimate the implicit prices associated with the attributes of
dierentiated products. Rosen's (1974) seminal work proposed a theoretical structure for
the hedonic regression and a two-stage procedure for the recovery of marginal willingness-to-
pay (MWTP) functions of heterogeneous individuals for the characteristics of dierentiated
products. Importantly, his two-stage approach allowed for two sources of preference hetero-
geneity: individuals' MWTP functions could dier with (i) their individual attributes and (ii)
the quantity of the product attribute that they consume. The latter is particularly important
when considering non-marginal policy changes (i.e., any change that is large enough to alter
the individual's willingness to pay at the margin). The two-stage procedure suggested by
Rosen (and further developed by subsequent authors) uses variation in implicit prices (ob-
tained either by employing data from multiple markets or by allowing for non-linearity in the
hedonic price function) to identify the MWTP function.
With Rosen (1974) as a backdrop, the property value hedonic model has become the
workhorse for valuing local public goods and environmental amenities, despite a number of
well-known and well-documented econometric problems.1 Our concern in this paper is with
an important problem that arises in the second stage of Rosen's two-step procedure. In
separate papers, Bartik (1987) and Epple (1987) describe a source of endogeneity that is
dicult to overcome using standard exclusion restriction arguments. Specically, they note
that unless the hedonic price function is linear, the hedonic price of a product attribute
varies systematically with the quantity consumed. The researcher therefore faces a dicult
endogeneity problem in the estimation of Rosen's second stage. Moreover, because of the
1See Taylor (2003) and Palmquist (2005) for a comprehensive discussion. Some of these problems arise in
the rst stage of Rosen's two-step procedure; for example, omitted variables that may be correlated with the
local attribute of interest. There is a large and growing literature that describes both quasi-experimental and
structural solutions to this problem (see Parmeter and Pope (2009) for a discussion).
2equilibrium features of the hedonic model, there are very few natural exclusion restrictions
that one can use to solve this endogeneity problem. In particular, within-market supply-side
shifters { the typical instrument of choice when estimating a demand equation { are not valid
in this context. This has generally left researchers to choose from a variety of weak instrument
strategies or instruments based on cross-market preference homogeneity assumptions that may
be dicult to justify. With a few exceptions, the hedonics literature has subsequently ignored
Rosen's second stage, focusing instead on recovering estimates of the hedonic price function
and valuing only marginal changes in amenities.2,3
In this paper, we propose an estimation procedure for the recovery of the structural pa-
rameters underlying the MWTP function that avoids the Bartik-Epple endogeneity problem
altogether. We do this by exploiting the relationship between the quantity of the amenity
being consumed and the attributes of the individuals doing the consumption. That such a
relationship should exist in hedonic equilibrium goes back to the idea of \stratication" found
in Ellickson (1971), which became the basis for estimable Tiebout sorting models.4 Our pro-
posed method is identied even in a single-market setting, given a exible representation of
the hedonic price function and a parametric representation of the MWTP function. Impor-
tantly, our procedure is computationally simple and easy to implement. Moreover, it does
not require any more in terms of data or assumptions than does the standard hedonic model.
2See, for example, Black (1999), Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000), Bui and Mayer (2003), Davis (2004),
Figlio and Lucas (2004), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Linden and Rocko (2008), Pope (2008), Greenstone
and Gallagher (2008), Bajari, Cooley, Kim, and Timmins (2011), and Gamper-Rabindran, Mastromonaco,
and Timmins (2011).
3Deacon et al. (1998) noted that \To date no hedonic model with site specic environmental amenities
has successfully estimated the second stage marginal willingness to pay function." Since that time, a number
of papers have examined the problem of recovering preferences from hedonic estimates. Bajari and Benkard
(2005) avoid the Bartik-Epple endogeneity problem by relying on strong parametric assumptions on utility
that turn Rosen's second-stage from an estimation problem into a preference-inversion procedure. We report
results based on their suggested procedure in our application. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) provide
an alternative approach to recovering MWTP that imposes very little in terms of parametric restrictions, but
requires an additive separability assumption in the MWTP specication. Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim
(2010) illustrate conditions under which non-separable utility functions may be non-parametrically identied
(in both single and multiple markets) and propose a non-parametric estimator.
4See, for example, Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984), Epple and Romano (1998), Epple and Platt (1998),
and Epple and Sieg (1999).
3To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, we implement our estimation procedure
using data on large changes in violent crime rates in the San Francisco Bay Metropolitan Area
over the period 1994 to 2000. We nd that recovering the full MWTP function is economically
important; an individual's marginal willingness to pay to avoid an incident of violent crime
(measured by cases per 100,000 residents) increases by 10 cents with each additional incident.
Non-marginal reductions in crime of the sort seen in San Francisco and the rest of the nation
during the 1990s therefore have the potential to signicantly aect MWTP. We nd that
naive estimators, which ignore this eect, yield estimates of total willingness to pay for crime
reductions in San Francisco that are signicantly biased. Similar problems are likely to arise
in other settings where policy changes are not marginal { e.g., air quality, school reform, and
hazardous waste site remediation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the endogeneity problem discussed
by Bartik (1987) and Epple (1987) and reiterates the intuition for why the problem has been
so dicult to solve with standard exclusion restrictions. Section 3 describes our alternative
estimation procedure in detail. Section 4 describes the data used in our application { hous-
ing transactions data from the San Francisco Metropolitan Area combined with violent and
property crime data from the RAND California Database. Section 5 reports the results of
applying our estimator to these data. Section 6 calculates the welfare eects from the actual
non-marginal changes in crime faced by a subset of homeowners and compares these welfare
eects with those calculated with alternative procedures in the existing literature. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
42 Why Has It Been So Dicult To Recover The MWTP
Function?
In their respective 1987 articles, Epple and Bartik each discuss the econometric problems
induced by the equilibrium sorting process that underlies the formation of the hedonic price
function. In particular, unobserved determinants of tastes aect both the quantity of an
amenity that an individual consumes and (if the hedonic price function is not linear) the
hedonic price of the attribute.5 In a regression like the one described in the second stage
of Rosen's two-step procedure, the quantity of the amenity that an individual consumes will
therefore be endogenous. Moreover, the exclusion restrictions typically used to estimate a
demand system (i.e., using supplier attributes as instruments) will not work because, in ad-
dition to aecting the quantity of amenity and the hedonic price paid for it, the unobservable
component of preferences also determines the supplier from whom the individual purchases.
Supplier attributes, which might naturally be used to trace-out the demand function, are
therefore correlated with the unobserved determinants of MWTP because of the sorting pro-
cess underlying the hedonic equilibrium.
To make these ideas concrete, consider the following simple example which is based on
Epple's model. We begin with the quadratic hedonic price function given by:






where i = 1;:::;N indexes houses, P(Zi;) measures the price of house i, and Zi measures
the level of the amenity associated with house i (for the sake of illustration, we ignore other
5The linear hedonic price function assumes that attributes can be unbundled and repackaged in any com-
bination without aecting their marginal value (e.g., the marginal value of another bedroom is the same
regardless of how many bedrooms a house already has). In most empirical settings, this assumption is unre-
alistic.
5amenities and house attributes). For now, we consider data from just a single market, but
allow for multi-market data in the following section. The linear price gradient associated with





= 1 + 2Zi
where P 0(Zi;) denotes the implicit price of Zi.
The second stage of Rosen's procedure seeks to recover the coecients of demand (or
marginal willingness to pay) and supply (or marginal willingness to accept) functions for the























i represent attributes of the buyers and sellers of house i, respectively. d
i
and s
i similarly represent unobserved idiosyncratic shocks to tastes and marginal costs.
The problem we consider in this paper arises from the fact that Zd
i must necessarily be
correlated with d
i because of the hedonic sorting process. This is easily shown in the following
equation. Noting that Zi = Zd






















where Ii is the income of household i. This marginal












6Equation (5) makes explicit that Zi will be correlated with d
i .7 Therefore, in order to
estimate Equation (3) directly, the literature has sought an instrument for Zd
i .
The typical approach to estimating demand functions with endogenous quantities uses
supply function shifters. The problem with that approach in this context, however, is that
hedonic sorting induces a correlation between d
i and Xs
i . Put dierently, d
i determines the
supplier from whom individual i purchases, so that Xs
i cannot be used to instrument for Zd
i .
In three respective papers, Epple (1987), Bartik (1987), and Kahn and Lang (1988)
propose alternative instrumental variables strategies to deal with this problem. Bartik, for
example, suggests instrumenting for Zd
i with market indicator variables. Kahn and Lang
suggest a similar instrument of market indicators interacted with household demographic
attributes. The intuition for these strategies is that dierences in the distribution of suppliers
across markets will provide an exogenous source of variation in the equilibrium quantity of the
amenity chosen by each individual. The problem with these approaches is that they require
strong assumptions about cross-market preference homogeneity and the instrument may not
induce sucient variation in the endogenous variable. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004)
propose an alternative instrumental variables approach to overcome the endogeneity problem.
They show that due to the non-linearity of the hedonic model, the conditional expectation
of Zd
i given Xd
i may be used to instrument for Zd
i . This instrumentation strategy does not
require assumptions about cross-market preference homogeneity and may be used in a single-
market setting. Our proposed estimation strategy diers from these previous approaches as
we avoid instrumental variables altogether. Our strategy is the subject of Section 3.
7It is clear that Zi will be correlated with d
i even when we allow for data coming from multiple markets.
73 Model and Estimation
In this section, we describe an alternative econometric approach, which avoids this dicult
endogeneity problem altogether, while not imposing strong assumptions on the shape of pref-
erences. Beginning with Rosen, the traditional approach has been to equate the implicit
price of the amenity Z (from the estimation of the hedonic price function) to its marginal
benet (which is a function of Z) and use the resulting expression as the estimating equation.
The majority of the literature following Rosen has retained this framework while proposing
corrective strategies to deal with the endogeneity of Z. We note that while the rst-order
conditions for hedonic equilibrium provide a set of equations that will hold in equilibrium,
nothing requires us to write the estimating equation in this manner. While this representation
does provide an intuitive interpretation of utility maximization, it is the \marginal cost equals
marginal benet" econometric specication itself which has created the endogeneity problem
that has plagued this literature for decades.
Returning to the basic structure of the hedonic model, there is no fundamental endo-
geneity problem. When choosing how much of the amenity Z to consume, individuals take
the hedonic price function as given and choose Zi to maximize utility based on their in-
dividual preferences. These preferences are determined by a vector of observed individual
characteristics, Xd
i , and unobserved taste shifters, d
i . As d
i and Xd
i are typically assumed
to be orthogonal in the hedonic model, we are left with a familiar econometric modeling en-
vironment: an endogenous outcome variable, Zi, which is a function of a vector of exogenous
variables, Xd
i , and an econometric error, d
i . Intuitively, our approach nds the parameters of
the MWTP function that maximize the likelihood of observing each household's chosen Zi.
We rst consider the case in which a closed-form solution for Zi exists and the estimation
approach is intuitive and simple. In the general case of our model, where a closed-form for
Zi may not exist, we show that by using a simple change-of-variables technique it is still
8straightforward to compute the likelihood of observing Zi. Also in this section, we provide
evidence of our estimator's small sample properties with Monte Carlo simulation results.
3.1 The Simple Model: When a Closed-Form Solution for Z Exists
In this subsection, we consider a special case of the general model in which Zi may be easily
isolated in the rst-order condition for utility maximization. While our proposed estimator is
applicable to a much richer specication of the model (as discussed in Section 3.2), we present
this simplied case rst as the estimation strategy is extremely transparent.
Consider the simple, linear-quadratic model where the hedonic price function is given
by:






and i indexes houses and j indexes markets (dened by space or time). The hedonic price





= 1;j + 2;jZi;j
where P 0(Zi;j;) denotes the implicit price of Zi;j.
Specifying the household's indirect utility as:
(8) U(Zi;j;X
d













where Ii represents household i's income, we arrive at the following rst-order condition for
9Zi;j:




i;j   1;j   2;jZi;j = 0





from the estimated price gradient, isolate this term on the left hand side
of Equation (9), and estimate the resulting regression equation (i.e., the MWTP function),
treating d










Our approach is to alternatively rearrange Equation (9) such that the single endogenous
variable, Zi;j, is isolated on the left:














Equation (11) describes how the consumption of the amenity Z varies with observable
household characteristics, Xd
i , unobservable preference shocks, d
i;j, and parameters of the
hedonic price function, f1;j;2;jg. This equation contains all of the information necessary
to recover the parameters describing individual preferences, f1;j;2;3;j;g. Using hats
to indicate that fd 1;j;d 2;jg are known from the rst-stage estimation of the hedonic price
function, we may write:
(12) Zi;j = (
1;j   d 1;j
d 2;j   2
) + (
3;j









Making the distributional assumption that d
i;j  N(0;2), Zi;j is then distributed nor-
10mally with mean ((
1;j d 1;j
d 2;j 2 ) + (
3;j
d 2;j 2)Xd
i )) and standard deviation ( 
2;j 2). This reveals a
straightforward Maximum Likelihood approach for estimating the remaining parameters.8 In
particular, we nd the vector of parameters, f1;j;2;3;j;g, that maximizes the likelihood
of the observed vector fZi;jgN
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2)2(Zi;j   ((
1;j   d 1;j
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2;j   2
) + (
3;j





3.1.1 Indirect Least Squares
It is worth considering the very special case of this model when estimation is particularly
straightforward: the case where the structural parameters may be recovered using a least-
squares estimation.
As an example, consider the specication above with exactly two markets. In this case,
Equation (12) may be estimated using an extremely transparent indirect least squares (ILS)
procedure. With the same number of equations as unknown structural parameters,9 it be-
comes a simple matter to recover the structural parameters f1;j, 2, 3;j, g from the
reduced-form parameters f0;j, 1;j, u;jg (which are recovered using OLS for each market j)
by exploiting the unique mapping between the two sets:
(14) Zi;j = (
1;j   d 1;j




















8Kahn and Lang (1988) suggest estimating a restricted version of Equation (12) via non-linear least squares.
However, their estimator requires the strong cross-market homogeneity assumption that all of the utility
parameters are constant across markets. Additionally, their proposed estimator is only applicable for the
subset of cases where a closed-form solution for Z exists and does not generalize to the cases we present in
Section 3.2.
9Let L denote the number of elements in X and J denote the number of markets. The reduced-form
estimation returns
 
J  (L + 1) + J

parameters. The number of structural parameters in Equation (12) is  
J  (L + 1) + 2

. Therefore, for J = 1, this model is underidentied (given the linear price gradient). For
J = 2, it is exactly identied. For J  3, the model is overidentied.
11With more than two markets, one could add richer heterogeneity to the MWTP function
(e.g., by parameterizing either the slope of the MWTP function or the variance of ) in order
to take advantage of all available information.10
3.2 The General Model: When a Closed-Form Solution for Z May
Not Exist
We now consider a more general form of the model, in which we do not rely on nding a
closed-form solution for Zi;j. The lack of a closed-form solution will be the case for most
non-linear gradient specications (including the log-linear gradient specication that we use
in our application in Section 5).11 In this case, we are still able to estimate the model using
Maximum Likelihood with a simple change-of-variables technique.
Consider rst the case where d
i;j is an additively-separable error that enters households'
linear MWTP functions and does not enter the hedonic price function. In this case, nding a
closed-form solution for d
i;j is trivial. We show that by employing a basic change of variables
(from Z to d), a closed-form solution for d
i;j is sucient for forming the likelihood of observing
Zi;j.
In the following example, we impose no parametric assumption on the price function,
P(Zi;j;), and show how it may no longer be possible to rearrange the rst-order condition
10One could also use this additional information with a more general estimation strategy to overidentify
the model's parameters.
11As a general rule, one should not expect the hedonic price gradient to be linear. Additionally, specifying the
MWTP to be linear is not inconsistent with a nonlinear price gradient in equilibrium; as clearly demonstrated
by Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), a linear MWTP function alone does not imply a linear price
gradient. For the equilibrium price gradient to be linear (with demand- and supply-side heterogeneity), it
would not only require that consumers have a perfectly linear MWTP function, but also that suppliers have
a perfectly linear marginal willingness-to-accept function and that shocks to both preferences and prots are
exactly normal. A key insight of the Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim paper is that very minor perturbations
of any of these conditions will lead to substantial non-linearity in the resulting equilibrium price gradient.
12to isolate Zi;j:











0(Zi;j;)   1;j   2Zi;j   3;jX
d
i
Making the distributional assumption that d
i;j  N(0;2) and using a textbook applica-
























To implement this Maximum Likelihood procedure, we only need to calculate the value
of d
i;j consistent with the observed value of Zi;j (given , b , and Xd
i ) and the determinant
of the Jacobian associated with the change of variables (i.e., we do not need to solve the













   = jP
00(Zi;j; b )   2j
In practice, nding the vector of parameters that maximizes the likelihood is straight-
13forward and may even be reduced to a one-dimensional numerical optimization problem.12
The model presented thus far is one where Zi;j is a scalar amenity. However, our approach
may be easily extended to estimate models that consider a K-dimensional vector of amenities
denoted Zi;j = [Z1
i;j;:::;ZK
i;j]. Assuming that the elements of the vector d
i;j are distributed
jointly normal with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix , the likelihood may be
formed employing the change-of-variables technique without the need to solve the dierential
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Finally, while the MWTP function specied thus far has been both linear and additively
separable in the idiosyncratic shock, d
i;j, richer specications of the MWTP function may
be estimated using our framework. Our estimator simply requires that one is able to isolate
the idiosyncratic shock, d
i;j. For example, (returning to a scalar amenity, Z) if the MWTP










12Concentrating the likelihood function given by Equation (17) allows for a single-dimensional search over
2. For each iteration of the likelihood (i.e., for each guess of 2), the likelihood-maximizing values of 1;j
and 3;j may be recovered through the least-squares regression of
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i;j + (Ii   P(Zi;j;)).
14then d
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and the likelihood may be formed using the change-of-variables technique.
It is important to note that the contribution of this paper is to illustrate a new estimation
approach that avoids the traditional endogeneity problems that have plagued the literature.
As the formal identication of the hedonic model has been discussed in detail in Brown and
Rosen (1982), Mendelsohn (1985), and particularly, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004)
and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010), we instead provide an informal discussion of
identication, as the nature of our estimator allows for easy illustration of what data features
pin down the parameters of the MWTP function.
Consider the model with linear MWTP outlined earlier in this section. When the MWTP
intercept (1), the coecients on Xd (3), and the MWTP variance (2) are common across
markets, they are identied by the mean Z, the covariance between Z and Xd, and the variance
of Z, respectively. Four sources of variation identify the slope of the MWTP function. The
rst source is the sensitivity of mean Z to changes in the price gradient across markets. The
second source is the sensitivity of the variance of Z to changes in the price gradient across
markets. The third source is the sensitivity of the covariance of Z and X to changes in
the price gradient across markets. The nal, fourth source is the nonlinearity of the price
gradient; Z will not be distributed normally when the gradient is nonlinear creating additional
identifying variation (particularly if Z is allowed to have market-specic distributions).
15When the intercept of the MWTP function is allowed to vary by market, the variation
in mean Z across markets is used to identify the market-specic intercepts of the MWTP
function and is no longer available to identify the slope of MWTP. In this case, higher levels
of mean Z are associated with higher market-specic values for 1;j, all else equal. A similar
logic applies when the coecients on Xd are allowed to vary by market and dierences in
the covariance between Z and Xd are used to identify f3;jgJ
j=1 or when the variance of d
is allowed to vary by market and variance of Z is used to identify f2
jgJ
j=1. Finally, when all
of the parameters of the MWTP function are allowed to vary by market, this is analogous to
multiple single-market cases and the non-linearity of the price gradient is the only remaining
source of identication of the MWTP slope. This is consistent with the established wisdom in
the hedonic literature - one either needs a non-linear hedonic price gradient or multi-market
data to recover the full MWTP function.
3.3 Monte Carlo Evidence
In this subsection, we provide Monte Carlo evidence on the performance of our proposed
estimator. We begin with Monte Carlo simulations of the simplest two-market model. From
this starting point, we increase the number of markets and increase the level of heterogeneity
in both the market-specic gradient intercepts and slopes. Finally, we allow the MWTP
intercept to vary by market.
For the rst simulations, the hedonic gradient is given by:
(25) P
0(Zi;j;) = 1;j + 2;jZi;j
and the rst-order condition for utility maximization is given by:




16yielding the MWTP function:
(27) P
0(Zi;j;) = 1 + 2Zi;j + 
d
i;j
and optimal consumption of Z:









We allow the number of markets to take on the following values: j = f2;5;10;50g.
We specify that 1;j = 2 + 1 and 2;j = 0:7 + 2 where 1  1  U( 0:3;0:3) and 2  2 
U( 0:15;0:15).  is allowed to take on the following values: 1 = f1;2;3g and 2 = f0;1;2;3g.
In all cases, we keep the total number of observations xed at n = 5;000 with observations
per market given by n
j. The number of Monte Carlo repetitions per experiment is 1;000. We
set the structural parameters to the following \true" values: 1=3, 2=   0:3, and =0:5.
The results in Table (1) show that there is very little bias in the nite samples, even
in the case of only two markets with limited information coming from each market. The
standard deviations of the estimated parameters are small relative to the parameters and,
more importantly, the eciency of the estimator is increasing in both market size and level
of gradient heterogeneity.
For comparison, we run the same set of Monte Carlo experiments using the traditional
two-step Rosen framework. Results are presented in Table (2). As expected, the estimator
performs poorly, particularly when it comes to recovering the slope of the MWTP function,
2. In all cases (even with 50 markets and maximum gradient heterogeneity across markets),
both the MWTP intercept (1) and the standard deviation of the preference shock () are
signicantly biased downwards. In addition, the MWTP slope is always biased upwards (as
expected); in all but two of the experiments, the mean value of the slope takes on a positive
17Table 1: Bishop-Timmins Results (common 1)
(\true" parameter values: 1 = 3, 2 =  0:3,  = 0:5)
mean(1) mean(2) mean() std(1) std(2) std()
j = 2;1 = 1;2 = 0 3.0035 -0.3036 0.5015 0.0709 0.0706 0.0357
j = 2;1 = 2;2 = 0 3.0004 -0.3006 0.5000 0.0354 0.0347 0.0182
j = 2;1 = 3;2 = 0 3.0000 -0.3001 0.4998 0.0241 0.0231 0.0127
j = 2;1 = 2 = 1 3.0015 -0.3016 0.5005 0.0460 0.0452 0.0233
j = 2;1 = 2 = 2 3.0002 -0.3003 0.4999 0.0240 0.0222 0.0124
j = 2;1 = 2 = 3 3.0000 -0.3001 0.4997 0.0171 0.0146 0.0091
j = 5;1 = 2 = 1 3.0002 -0.3003 0.4999 0.0342 0.0331 0.0175
j = 5;1 = 2 = 2 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4997 0.0182 0.0159 0.0097
j = 5;1 = 2 = 3 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4997 0.0133 0.0100 0.0074
j = 10;1 = 2 = 1 3.0002 -0.3003 0.4998 0.0309 0.0296 0.0158
j = 10;1 = 2 = 2 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4997 0.0166 0.0141 0.0089
j = 10;1 = 2 = 3 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4997 0.0123 0.0087 0.0069
j = 50;1 = 2 = 1 3.0000 -0.3001 0.4998 0.0285 0.0271 0.0147
j = 50;1 = 2 = 2 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4996 0.0155 0.0128 0.0084
j = 50;1 = 2 = 3 2.9998 -0.2999 0.4996 0.0117 0.0078 0.0066
value (implying an upward sloping demand curve).
Finally, we return to our estimator and run a set of experiments where the MWTP
intercept, 1, is allowed to vary across markets. We specify that 1;j  U(2;4), while keeping
2 =  0:3 and  = 0:5. Note that in this specication, we require heterogeneity in the
the slope of the gradients across markets and do not estimate the cases where 2 = 0. Our
estimator performs well in each case, including the case with only two markets and minimum
gradient heterogeneity. The results from these experiments are presented in Table (3).
18Table 2: Rosen Results (common 1)
(\true" parameter values: 1 = 3, 2 =  0:3,  = 0:5)
mean(1) mean(2) mean() std(1) std(2) std()
j = 2;1 = 1;2 = 0 2.0385 0.6615 0.0980 0.0026 0.0026 0.0003
j = 2;1 = 2;2 = 0 2.1381 0.5619 0.1857 0.0044 0.0042 0.0009
j = 2;1 = 3;2 = 0 2.2649 0.4350 0.2572 0.0053 0.0049 0.0017
j = 2;1 = 2 = 1 2.0802 0.6129 0.1455 0.0035 0.0036 0.0007
j = 2;1 = 2 = 2 2.2557 0.4224 0.2598 0.0055 0.0049 0.0019
j = 2;1 = 2 = 3 2.4299 0.2332 0.3369 0.0068 0.0050 0.0029
j = 5;1 = 2 = 1 2.1492 0.5381 0.1984 0.0048 0.0047 0.0012
j = 5;1 = 2 = 2 2.4131 0.2525 0.3299 0.0068 0.0052 0.0028
j = 5;1 = 2 = 3 2.6150 0.0358 0.4022 0.0079 0.0047 0.0038
j = 10;1 = 2 = 1 2.1774 0.5076 0.2163 0.0050 0.0049 0.0014
j = 10;1 = 2 = 2 2.4654 0.1963 0.3501 0.0071 0.0051 0.0031
j = 10;1 = 2 = 3 2.6669 -0.0187 0.4185 0.0081 0.0045 0.0040
j = 50;1 = 2 = 1 2.2022 0.4807 0.2309 0.0053 0.0050 0.0015
j = 50;1 = 2 = 2 2.5067 0.1519 0.3652 0.0073 0.0050 0.0033
j = 50;1 = 2 = 3 2.7046 -0.0582 0.4299 0.0082 0.0043 0.0042
Table 3: Bishop-Timmins Results (market-specic 1;j)
(\true" parameter values: 2 =  0:3,  = 0:5)
mean(2) mean() std(2) std()
j = 2;1 = 2 = 1 -0.3531 0.5263 0.2406 0.1209
j = 2;1 = 2 = 2 -0.3139 0.5066 0.1028 0.0524
j = 2;1 = 2 = 3 -0.3068 0.5031 0.0662 0.0345
j = 5;1 = 2 = 1 -0.3277 0.5134 0.1535 0.0775
j = 5;1 = 2 = 2 -0.3084 0.5037 0.0693 0.0359
j = 5;1 = 2 = 3 -0.3045 0.5018 0.0431 0.0233
j = 10;1 = 2 = 1 -0.3221 0.5103 0.1335 0.0675
j = 10;1 = 2 = 2 -0.3068 0.5027 0.0606 0.0316
j = 10;1 = 2 = 3 -0.3036 0.5012 0.0370 0.0204
j = 50;1 = 2 = 1 -0.3193 0.5069 0.1220 0.0616
j = 50;1 = 2 = 2 -0.3061 0.5003 0.0554 0.0290
j = 50;1 = 2 = 3 -0.3033 0.4990 0.0333 0.0186
194 Data
We apply our estimator to valuing the willingness to pay to avoid violent crime in the San
Francisco Metropolitan Area over the period 1994 to 2000. Further details and results of this
application are discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
In the rst stage of our estimation, we recover the parameters of the hedonic price
function for each year of our sample. In the second stage of our estimation, we recover the
structural parameters of the linear MWTP function, allowing MWTP to vary with demo-
graphic characteristics. Finally, to demonstrate the policy implications of various hedonic
estimators, we consider the non-marginal policy analysis of the observed changes in crime for
the one year period of 1999 to 2000.
To estimate these specications, we employ a varied set of data from multiple sources.
These data and our sample cuts are discussed below.
4.1 Property Transactions Data
The real estate transactions data that we employ covers six counties of the San Francisco
Bay Area (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara) over
the period 1994 to 2000. This dataset (used under a licensing agreement with DataQuick,
Inc.) includes dates, prices, loan amounts, and buyers', sellers', and lenders' names for all
transactions. In addition, for the nal observed transaction of each single-family property,
the dataset includes housing characteristics such as exact street address, square footage, year
built, lot size, number of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms.
Additional data cuts are made in order to deal with the fact that DataQuick only reports
housing characteristics at the time of the nal observed transaction, but we need to use housing
20characteristics from all transactions as controls in our hedonic price regressions.14 First, to
control for land sales or total re-builds, we drop all transactions where \year built" is missing
or later than the observed transaction date. Second, to control for major improvements or
degradations, we drop any property with an observed average appreciation or depreciation
rate exceeding the county- and year- specic mean price change by more than 50 percentage
points (in either direction). Additionally, we drop any property that moves more than 40
percentile points (in either direction) between transactions in the overall county- and year-
specic distribution of price. We drop transactions where the price is missing or zero and,
after using the consumer price index to convert all transaction prices into 2000 dollars, we
drop one percent of observations from each tail of the price distribution to minimize the eect
of outliers. As we merge the pollution data using the property's geographic coordinates, we
drop properties where latitude and longitude are missing. Finally, we drop houses with more
than three observed transactions over the 7 year sample and drop multiple sales within a
given year.15
This yields a nal sample of 403,036 transactions. Table (4) reports the summary statis-
tics for the property transactions data.
4.2 Household Demographic Data
For our demographic characteristics, we use information on the race and income of buyers
recorded on mortgage applications and published in accordance with the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975. The HMDA data also describe the mortgage lender's name,
the loan amount, the year, and the property's census tract. As the variables of lender name,
14Approximately fty-ve percent of observed sales are the only observed sale for the property.
15To maintain a fairly homogenous sample (i.e., properties that would be competing in the same housing
market), we make the additional sample cuts. We drop houses where \year built" is less than 1850, \lot
size" is greater than 3 acres, \square footage" is zero or greater than 10,000 square feet, total \number of
bathrooms" is greater than 10, total \number of bedrooms" is greater than 10, total \number of rooms" is
missing or greater than 15, and \number of stories" is missing or greater than 3.
21Table 4: Property Transactions Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Price (constant 2000 dollars) 345,823.00 192,210.00
Year Built 1966.64 23.16
Lot Size (sq. ft) 6,453.55 7,927.96
Square Footage 1662.76 671.69
Number Bathrooms 2.07 0.73
Number Bedrooms 3.01 1.09
Property Crimes (per 100,000 residents) 1,803.43 771.48
Violent Crimes (per 100,000 residents) 445.69 241.19
loan amount, year, and census tract are also available in the DataQuick data, we are able to
merge the buyer characteristics data with the property transactions data using the algorithm
described in Bayer et. al. (2011).16 We drop all households where either race or income is
missing.
Table (5) reports the summary statistics for the sample of buyers in both the full sample
and in the restricted, 1999-only sample. This restricted sample will be used in the policy
analysis that demonstrates the implications of valuing non-marginal changes in violent crime
rates.
4.3 Violent Crime Data
The violent crime rate that we employ comes from the RAND California database and is
dened as the number of incidents per 100,000 residents.17 Violent crime is reported for each
16Using this algorithm, we are able to uniquely match approximately eighty percent of all housing trans-
actions to buyers in the HMDA dataset. The characteristics of the nal sample of buyers and houses is
remarkably close to those found in IPUMS samples. See Bayer et. al. (2011) for examples and further
discussion.
17In the data, violent crime is dened as \crimes against people, including homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault."
22Table 5: Buyer Summary Statistics (Full- and 1999- Samples)
Full Sample 1999 Sample
(n = 262;498) (n = 49;438)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price 354,002.90 193,464.20 372,028.60 200,698.10
Violent Crime 445.46 242.24 369.06 171.67
Income 111,312.90 111,607.30 111,338.40 87,321.00
White 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.49
Asian 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.43
Black 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Prices and incomes are expressed in constant 2000 dollars. The violent crime
rate is per 100,000 residents.
of the 80 cities in the San Francisco Metropolitan Area for each year of our data. Figure (1)
illustrates the locations of these cities.
Figure 1: Locations of Crime-reporting Cities within the San Francisco Metro Area
For our analysis, we impute a violent crime rate for each individual house using an
23inverse distance-squared weighted average of the crime rate in each city.18 As a control in our
hedonic regressions, we also create an analogous measure of property crime rates from the
RAND California database.19,20 Table (4) provides summary statistics for both violent crime
and property crime at the level of the house. Table (5) provides summary statistics for our
variable of interest, violent crime, at the level of the buyer.
We see a signicant amount of variation (both cross-sectional and time-series) in our key
variable of interest, violent crime. Figures (2) and (3) illustrate the distribution of violent
crime rates and the time-trend of mean violent crime rates, respectively. The declining trend
observed in the San Francisco Metropolitan Area is consistent with the decreases in violent
crime observed in most of the US over the same period.
Figure 2: Distribution of Violent Crime Rates (Incidents per 100,000 Residents)
18Distance is computed using the Great Circle estimator, geographic coordinates of city centroids, and
geographic coordinates of each house.
19Property crime is dened as \crimes against property, including burglary and motor vehicle theft."
20We use the property crime rate as a control in our hedonic estimation and focus attention on violent
crimes in our valuation exercise, as violent crimes are less likely to be subject to systematic under-reporting
(Gibbons (2004)).
24Figure 3: Time Variation in Violent Crime Rates (Incidents per 100,000 Residents)
5 Results
5.1 Hedonic Price Function
In this subsection, we discuss the results from the estimation of a log-linear hedonic price
function. Separately for each year, 1994 to 2000, we regress the log of sales price on housing
attributes and tract-level xed eects. Regression results are reported in Table (6), with each
row representing a separate annual regression. In the vast majority of cases, hedonic price
estimates have the expected sign and magnitude.21
For discussion purposes, we calculate the implicit price of each attribute at the mean
housing price of $345;823, given in 2000 dollars, and annualize these implicit prices by multi-
21An exception is the sign on property crime, which exhibits a counterintuitive positive sign in 1994 and
1996. This is not surprising as property crime is usually considered to be under-reported (unlike violent crime,
which we focus on in our analysis). If underreporting is more severe in low-price neighborhoods, this could
the coecient to be biased upwards.
25Table 6: Hedonic Price Function Estimates
Year Built Lot Size Sq. Footage Bathrooms Bedrooms Prop. Crime Violent Crime
19948.26E-04***6.47061E-06***3.45E-04*** 6.00E-03** 0.0348*** -4.77E-05*** -2.65E-04***
(9.36E-05) (2.57963E-07) (3.24E-06) (2.77E-03) (1.69E-03) (5.81E-06) (2.40E-05)
19958.19E-04***6.63532E-06***3.49E-04***9.51E-03*** 0.0370*** -1.04E-05 -5.04E-04***
(1.09E-04) (2.95071E-07) (4.76E-06) (3.53E-03) (1.93E-03) (6.92E-06) (3.30E-05)
19967.41E-04***6.53443E-06***3.58E-04*** 0.0136*** 0.0432*** -1.64E-05** -4.64E-04***
(8.85E-05) (3.3423E-07) (4.29E-06) (3.24E-03) (1.69E-03) (7.50E-06) (3.05E-05)
19974.40E-04***7.12735E-06***3.57E-04*** 0.0186*** 0.0430*** 8.05E-07 -6.04E-04***
(7.61E-05) (2.64862E-07) (4.62E-06) (3.03E-03) (1.67E-03) (8.48E-06) (2.95E-05)
19982.34E-04***7.05921E-06***3.56E-04*** 0.0251*** 0.0430*** 1.13E-04*** -9.73E-04***
(8.55E-05) (3.33583E-07) (6.01E-06) (3.59E-03) (2.03E-03) (9.16E-06) (3.98E-05)
1999 9.28E-05 7.38838E-06***3.55E-04*** 0.0211*** 0.0451*** 6.18E-05*** -1.01E-03***
(7.99E-05) (2.52938E-07) (3.30E-06) (2.51E-03) (1.37E-03) (9.68E-06) (3.35E-05)
20003.86E-04*** 8.016E-06*** 3.35E-04*** 0.0246*** 0.0431*** 1.32E-04*** -1.22E-03***
(8.55E-05) (3.6165E-07) (4.24E-06) (2.97E-03) (1.71E-03) (1.03E-05) (4.74E-05)
Dependent variable is the log of sales price. Data are mean-dierenced to remove 830 tract-level xed eects.
Signicance is indicated by: ***(0.01), **(0.05), and *(0.10).
plying them by 0.05.22 The implicit price of an additional square foot of lot size is, on average,
11 cents per year in 1994. The implicit price of an additional square foot of living space is
$5:97 per year in 1994. These prices vary somewhat, but are relatively stable over time. Also
in 1994, an additional bathroom costs $103:75 per year, while an additional bedroom costs
$602:37 per year. The implicit prices of bedrooms and bathrooms vary somewhat over time,
while the eect of year built varies a great deal over time (both in magnitude and sign).
Our amenity of interest, violent crime, exhibits an intuitive negative eect on housing
prices that is statistically signicant. Over the period of our sample, we see this eect in-
creasing over time. In 1994, the implicit price of additional unit of violent crime is  $4:59,
while in 2000 it is  $21:07. Table (7) reports the year-to-year variation in the implicit price
22These measures of implicit price are those that often used as simple, marginal measures of willingness to
pay in the existing literature.
26of violent crime.










In this subsection, we report the results from our procedure for recovering estimates of the
MWTP function using the rst-stage hedonic price function estimates and data on individual
home buyers. With the log-linear specication for the hedonic price function, a closed-form
solution for Zi;j cannot be recovered and we employ a change of variables from Z to d. We
specify a linear MWTP function and allow the intercept of the MWTP function to vary by
year by including a set of year dummies in our estimation:
(29) P
0(V Ci;t;) = 1;t + 2V Ci;t + X
d 0









i is a vector comprised of income (in thousands of 2000 dollars) and a vector of race
dummies (Asian-Pacic Islander, black, Hispanic, and white).23
23White is the excluded race.
27The rst column of Table (8) reports the results from our estimator. First, consider the
coecient on violent crime, 2, which reveals the amount by which the individual's MWTP
to avoid violent crime changes with an increase in this disamenity. Intuitively, this coecient
should be negative, indicating that the MWTP to avoid violent crime increases as the rate of
violent crime increases (consistent with a demand curve for public safety that is downward
sloping). We nd this to be the case with our model; each additional incident per 100,000
residents raises MWTP to avoid violent crime by 10 cents. As we show in Section 6, this has
important implications for the value ascribed to large reductions in violent crime rates like
those witnessed over the period of our sample.
Looking at the the remaining coecient estimates derived using our model, an increase
in income of $1,000 per year increases MWTP to avoid violent crime by 5.8 cents (consistent
with public safety being a normal good). Considering dierences in MWTP by race, the
excluded group (Whites) has the highest mean MWTP to avoid violent crime. Our model
suggests that Asian-Pacic Islanders have a slightly lower mean MWTP (as indicated by their
positive intercept shift of $2.84). Blacks have the lowest mean MWTP to avoid violent crime,
followed by Hispanics.
For the sake of comparison, the second column of Table (8) reports the results from the
traditional Rosen estimation approach. These results are strikingly dierent from the results
presented in the rst column. In contrast to our estimator, estimates from the Rosen model
suggest that increases in violent crime reduce the MWTP to avoid violent crime (indicating
that the demand curve for public safety is upward sloping). This is exactly the direction of
bias suggested by both Bartik and Epple and leads to upwardly biased estimates of the welfare
associated with non-marginal reductions in violent crime (which we show in Section 6). Ad-
ditionally, while the coecient on income is of the same sign, the magnitude is much smaller.
Finally, race does not appear to play an economically signicant role in the estimates derived
using the Rosen estimation approach (although the coecients are statistically signicant).
28Table 8: MWTP Function Estimates
Bishop-Timmins Rosen
Violent Crime -0.1008 3.51E-03
(3.66E-03) (1.05E-04)










1995 dummy -6.2501 -2.2899
0.5187 0.4489
1996 dummy -11.8685 -1.5536
0.5090 0.4167
1997 dummy -12.8032 -3.1074
0.5172 0.3957
1998 dummy -18.4337 -7.2178
0.6021 0.4639
1999 dummy -27.1906 -7.5220
0.7219 0.4835




All coecients are signicant at the 1% level of signicance.
6 Measuring the Welfare Implications of a Non-Marginal
Change in Violent Crime Rates
As is clear from our data description, the San Francisco Metropolitan Area experienced a
large and persistent reduction in average violent crime rates over the course of our sample
29period. Similar reductions have been observed in numerous other cities across the US. Out of
the 25 cities that he considers, Levitt (2004) ranks San Francisco 12th in terms of the size of
the reduction in homicides experienced between 1991 - 2001. This change in the violent crime
rate represents a signicant improvement on average and is, importantly, non-marginal.24
There is a large and growing literature aimed at valuing the benets of crime reductions
(with, for example, the goal of conducting cost-benet analysis of police force expansions).
This literature was recently surveyed by Heaton (2010). He notes that the property value
hedonic technique is valuable for recovering the intangible costs of crime (e.g., lost quality
of life for fear of victimization or eective loss of public space). Such intangibles are likely
to be particularly important for measuring the costs of violent crime (a point emphasized by
Linden and Rocko (2008) with respect to sexual oenses).
For this welfare analysis, we consider the set of all individuals who purchased a house in
1999 (summary statistics describing these individuals is given in Table (5)). We then measure
the value of the crime changes that these individuals actually experienced between 1999 and
2000. It is highly likely that these individuals still occupy the same residence in 2000 and, as
we show in this section, the changes that occurred over this year were substantial enough that
proper identication of the MWTP function becomes important in measuring their change in
welfare. In particular, Figure (4) illustrates the distribution of changes in violent crime rates
experienced by this set of households. The 1999 data allows us to consider the welfare changes
associated with both reductions and increases in crime; approximately sixty percent of these
households experienced reductions in violent crime during this period while the remaining
forty percent experienced increases in violent crime.
24Levitt (2004) discusses six factors that he argues were not responsible for these declines, including economic
growth and reduced unemployment, shifting age and racial demographics, changes in policing strategies,
changes in gun control laws and laws controlling concealed weapons, and changes in capital punishment. He
argues instead that there is a strong case to be made for the role of increasing size of the police force, increased
incarceration rats, declines in the crack epidemic, and the legalization of abortion twenty years prior. The
relative importance of each of these factors is still a contentious topic. See, for example, Blumstein and
Wallman (2006).
30Figure 4: Distribution of One-Year Violent Crime Rate Changes for 1999 Buyers
For the purposes of illustration, we report valuations based on three dierent estimation
strategies: (i) Bishop-Timmins, (ii) Rosen, and (iii) horizontal MWTP. The third approach
assigns a constant willingness to pay to each individual equal to the slope of the hedonic price
function at their observed housing choice. As the utility function is assumed to be linear
in Z (i.e., the MWTP function is constant in Z), this approach corresponds to either the
\inversion" procedure outlined in Bajari and Benkard (2005) or to the Rosen (1974) model
where the endogeneity problem is trivially solved by assuming that the MWTP function
doesn't depend on Z. In this case, the welfare eects may be calculated as the area of the
rectangle under the horizontal MWTP, with the width given by the experienced change in
violent crime. For the rst two strategies, the value associated with a change in the violent
31crime rate is calculated as the area of the trapezoid under the MWTP function over the width
of the experienced change in violent crime.
We report results separately for the sixty percent of buyers who experienced a reduction
in their violent crime rate and for the remaining forty percent of buyers who experienced an
increase in Table (9).25 Note that the large standard deviations of WTP illustrate skewness
of the distributions, versus individuals experiencing counterintuitive (positive) signs on their
WTP.
Table 9: WTP for Non-Marginal Changes in Violent Crime
Buyers with Reductions Buyers with Increases
(n = 29;953) (n = 19;485)
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
WTP WTP WTP WTP
Bishop-Timmins 269.57 328.26 -980.69 1896.06
Rosen 401.15 543.86 -581.88 679.76
Horizontal MWTP 395.83 532.83 -595.31 710.78
The bias from improperly accounting for the eect of a non-marginal change in violent
crime on MWTP is evident. Consider rst the case of crime reductions. The Rosen model and
horizontal MWTP yield estimates of the average WTP for observed reductions that are 1.49
times greater than our model, implying an almost fty-percent upward bias. The direction
of the bias is reversed when we consider increases in the rates of violent crime. Here, the
alternative models yield estimates of average WTP for observed crime reductions that are
only 0.59 of our estimate. These dierences are far from trivial and would have an important
impacts on any cost-benet analysis.
25In the calculations for buyers experiencing a decrease in violent crime, we restrict the marginal willingness
to pay curve to be non-positive. This has little eect on the welfare implications; our average willingness to
pay without this restriction is 243.68.
327 Conclusion
Researchers regularly ascribe downward sloping demand curves to households for goods rang-
ing from breakfast cereals to BMWs. In fact, recovering the price elasticity of demand for such
goods constitutes one of the main activities undertaken by applied microeconomists. How-
ever, because of the dicult endogeneity problems associated with the recovery of the MWTP
function using the hedonic technique, the same exibility has generally not been applied to
household demand for local public goods and amenities. Instead, applications of the hedo-
nic method have tended to focus only on the rst-stage hedonic price regression; recovering
parameters that only yield valid welfare estimates for marginal policies. In order to prop-
erly evaluate the welfare eects associated with larger policies, the researcher must recover
the structural parameters of the MWTP function. In this paper, we propose an estimation
approach for the recovery of these parameters, while avoiding the endogeneity problems so
commonly associated with the hedonic model.
We show that there is no fundamental endogeneity problem in the hedonic model; the
endogeneity problems are largely manufactured and are a result of framing Rosen's second
stage regression in terms of marginal cost (implicit attribute price) equaling marginal benet
(marginal utility from consuming the amenity in question). We instead rearrange the informa-
tion provided by the hedonic equilibrium and arrive at a simple modeling environment with
a single endogenous outcome variable, a vector of exogenous variables, and an econometric
error.
Estimation of the model is straightforward and consists of a standard Maximum Like-
lihood procedure which employs a textbook change-of-variables technique. In a restricted
version of the model, a closed-form solution for the amenity of interest may be found analyt-
ically and the change of variables is not required. Estimation in the simplest version of the
model may even be reduced to an indirect least squares procedure, exploiting the one-to-one
33mapping between the structural and reduced-form parameters. Like the Rosen model, our
approach is (i) quite intuitive, as it is derived from the rst-order condition for utility max-
imization, (ii) able to incorporate rich individual- and market- level heterogeneity, and (iii)
computationally light and easy to implement. Additionally, our model requires no more in
terms of data than the standard hedonic model.
Using a series of Monte Carlo experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed estimator
presents very little bias in nite samples. Applying our model to data on violent crime
rates in California's Bay Area, we nd that properly accounting for the shape of the MWTP
function has important implications for measuring the welfare eects of non-marginal changes
in violent crime. Considering the welfare eects associated with the observed one-year change
in crime for those households that purchased a house in 1999, we nd that alternative modeling
procedures overstate benets (for those households which experienced a decrease in violent
crime) by fty percent relative to our approach and understate costs (for those households
which experienced an increase in violent crime) by forty percent relative to our approach.
These dierences are both statistically and economically signicant and consequential for
cost-benet analyses of policies that may have large impacts on future crime rates.
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